Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

TOP SECRET

ED

25X1

22 September 1958

25X1

Copy No. C 59

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 9
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE 4-480 REVIEWER:

25X1

25X1

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 September 1958

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

[redacted]

USSR: According to the American Embassy in Moscow, the Taiwan Strait crisis has not given rise to popular apprehension which during the Middle East crisis of last summer led to scare buying and hoarding in the Soviet Union. The general consensus among Western diplomats in the USSR is that the Soviet leaders do not want or even expect war to develop from the strait situation. High Soviet Foreign Ministry officials gave the Finnish ambassador the impression there would be no war. Ulbricht reportedly told his central committee colleagues that Moscow expected to bring the strait crisis to the United Nations for adjudication, with the ultimate goal of obtaining UN membership for Peiping.

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

East Germany: An East German party plenum in mid-October may adopt measures to modify quietly the hard course launched by the fifth party congress last July. Such a change at a time when other satellites are tightening up would reflect the Ulbricht regime's alarm over the growing discontent in East Germany, exemplified by the large refugee movement to the West.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanon: Tension in Beirut as a result of the recent wave of Christian-Moslem kidnappings will probably remain high for the next few days. The pro-Chamoun Christian Phalange party is likely to carry out its threat to call a protest strike on 22 September and will probably be supported by other pro-Chamoun groups. Extensive violence, however, is not likely prior to Shihab's inauguration on 23 September in view of the elaborate precautions taken by the Lebanese Army.

Jordan: King Husayn, confronted with growing factionalism in the government and in the army, is still considering key personnel changes, including replacement of his authoritarian prime minister, Samir Rifai, and Rifai's protegé, Army Deputy Chief of Staff Sadiq Shara.

A UN representative will arrive in Jordan about 24 September to establish a "watchdog" mission there. The semi-official Cairo newspaper Al Ahram, however, has denied that Nasir agreed to establishment of elements of such a mission in the UAR.

III. THE WEST

France - Algeria: Premier De Gaulle, in statements which are now public, let it be known that he regards either independence or integration for Algeria as "unrealistic." He may have underestimated, however, the extent of military and other opposition to any solution for Algeria other than integration, and he is likely to face open opposition from the army, possibly during his 2-3 October visit to Algeria.

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

25X1

East Germany May Ease Hard-Line Program

The East German Communist party's central committee will hold a plenum in mid-October to formulate measures to alter quietly the hard line adopted last July at the fifth party
25X1 congress, [redacted] These measures reportedly will include eased restrictions on travel to West Germany and a slowdown in the drive for full socialization.

25X1 [redacted] Party First Secretary Ulbricht and a few trusted colleagues are now preparing the agenda for the plenum and that they expect to ease restrictions without fanfare in order to minimize the contradictions with the fifth congress program. Such a relaxation at a time when other satellites are imposing harsher measures would reflect official East German alarm over the growing discontent in East Germany, which has caused serious manpower and talent losses through refugee flights to the West.

Already East Germany has granted sweeping concessions to physicians in what is openly admitted by the party press to be a move to stem the serious loss of doctors. Additional concessions are not likely to appease the populace and may inspire popular demands for even further liberalization. Furthermore an easing in travel restrictions to the West is likely to increase the refugee flow and thus heighten the dilemma of the Ulbricht regime. [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]

[redacted] 25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Tension Increasing in Lebanon

The pro-Chamoun Christian Phalange party in Lebanon has called on its supporters to prepare for a general strike on 22 September, the day before General Shihab's inauguration as president, in protest against recent rebel "provocations." The Lebanese Army imposed a round-the-clock curfew in Beirut on 21 September and has instituted other precautions in an effort to forestall further and more serious violence prior to Shihab's inauguration. The Phalange, however, has called on its supporters to ignore the curfew.

Tension in Beirut continues high, reflecting the wave of Moslem-Christian kidnappings in the city on 19 and 20 September. The incidents began when members of the opposition seized the editor of the pro-Chamoun Christian Phalange party newspaper. The Phalangists believe their editor may have been murdered. Both sides retaliated, in turn, by seizing hostages. By noon of 20 September, 96 Moslems had been abducted, including the cousin of rebel leader Saib Salam. Armed Phalangists are said to have resisted a Lebanese Army attempt to surround their headquarters, and Christians in areas adjoining the rebel-held Basta quarter are fearful of further rebel kidnappings. Despite the release of many captives by both sides, the new tensions have increased the prospect of Moslem-Christian conflict.

If the present situation, which Christians term "electric," continues, the success of the planned general arms collection by Shihab would be diminished considerably. Shihab has supplied arms to the recently legalized pro-Chamoun Popular Social party (PPS), possibly to counterbalance armed rebel groups and to ensure PPS support in the face of possible rebel recalcitrance.

25X1 [redacted] about 300 armed men from Syria have arrived to augment rebel Druze leader Jumblatt's forces in the mountains southeast of Beirut. They brought arms, ammunition, and winter clothing for

[redacted]

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

Jumblatt's men. Two Syrian officers are reported to have accompanied the party. Lebanese Army officers are very disturbed by this move and feel it is aimed at the future Shihab government, since the present government will leave office on 23 September. Syrian reinforcements arrived recently in northern Lebanon, that 90 Syrian commandos returned to Beirut on 11 September, a "committee for destructive activities and terrorism" composed of UAR officers and Lebanese rebels has been set up in the Basta.

Opposition leader Nasim Majdalani, a Druze, told the American ambassador in Cairo that, while the Egyptian attitude toward Lebanon appeared favorable, Syria continues to be unfriendly. He intimated that Saraj, UAR minister of interior for Syria, was behind this animosity.

efforts of the Lebanese Government to sell American wheat sent to alleviate the grain shortage have been blocked by rebel pressure on millers.

25X1

Developments in Jordan

King Husayn has indicated the desirability of certain personnel and policy changes within the Jordanian Government in the near future to avert growing friction among the palace, the government, and the army. The King [redacted] is considering replacing his unpopular authoritarian prime minister, Samir Rifai. Another candidate for dismissal is Rifai's protegé, Army Deputy Chief of Staff Sadiq Shara, whose loyalty to the King remains in question. If Husayn is to succeed in developing a more popular and stable government, he will have to remove other unpopular ministers, including Interior Minister Madadha, and seek some sort of accommodation with Jordan's Arab neighbors. These reforms, however, would involve risk to Jordan's pro-Western orientation and to the position of the monarchy. The King's decision to implement reforms and changes in key personnel is rendered more critical by the impending departure, possibly by the end of October, of British troops, which have maintained him in power since mid-July.

25X1

The King's disenchantment with Rifai reflects in part the influence of Court Minister Hazza Majali, [redacted] who has sought to impress the King that Rifai's unpopularity threatens the monarchy. Rifai in turn has accused Majali of gross corruption when he was an official of the Jordan Development Board, and has made common cause with Sadiq Shara. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

While UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's report to the General Assembly on the results of his Middle East

[redacted]

25X1

mission has not yet been released, the semiofficial Cairo newspaper Al Ahram has denied reports that Nasir agreed to establishment of elements of a UN "watchdog" mission in Damascus to facilitate communication with the UN mission which is to be established in Jordan about 24 September.



25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

III. THE WEST

De Gaulle Faces Showdown on Algerian Integration

When Premier De Gaulle visits Algeria on 2-3 October, he may face a showdown with French Army leaders on his reluctance to come out clearly for a policy of integrating Algeria with France. He had earlier seemed intent on concealing his personal views on an Algerian solution, pending the expected adoption of his new constitution in the 28 September referendum.

25X1

25X1 he considers integration "unrealistic," however, and on 20 September he was reported to have told a small gathering in Rennes that independence for Algeria was a "foolish solution," just as much as integration was.

Both the military and the settlers in Algeria have maintained they will interpret the expected favorable vote in Algeria as a demand for integration.

25X1

25X1

Much of De Gaulle's support in the Socialist and Radical parties stems from the belief that he will publicly "break with the rightists" in formulating an Algerian solution soon after the referendum. Recent moves have increased the government's authority over the armed forces, but De Gaulle may have underestimated the full extent of the military's opposition to any policy except integration.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

25X1

THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004000090001-7

25X1

25X1